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Abstract. Recent work on the logical structure of non-locality has con-
structed scenarios where observations of multi-partite systems cannot be
adequately described by compositions of non-signaling subsystems. In
this paper we apply these frameworks to economics. First we construct
a empirical model of choice, where choices are understood as observ-
able outcomes in a certain sense. An analysis of contextuality within
this framework allows us to characterize which scenarios allow for the
possible construction of an adequate global choice rule. In essence, we
mathematically characterize when it makes sense to consider the choices
of a group as composed of individual choices. We then map out the
logical space of some relevant empirical principles, relating properties
of these contextual choice scenarios to no-signalling theories and to the
weak axiom of revealed preference.
Keywords: contextuality · choice theory · weak axiom of choice · no-
signalling
1 Introduction
In this paper we uncover a connection between observed choices in economics
and empirical models in quantum physics. In particular, we show the precise rela-
tionships between the weak axiom of revealed preferences, a consistency property
often imposed in choice theory, and contextuality and no-signalling conditions
on measurements in the foundations of quantum physics.
The framework we use is borrowed from work in the foundations of quantum
mechanics where a general logical theory of contextuality has been developed
in recent years. Our work applies the empirical models and the framework of
contextuality beyond quantum physics or computer science. In this sense, we are
furthering the work of Abramsky et. al. [1,2,3,4,12] by showing that observed
economic choices can be seen as one instantiation of an abstract contextual
semantics.
Our paper is related to two strands of work. On the one hand there is a grow-
ing literature that considers the consequences of quantum-resources for economic
theory. This interaction between quantum foundations and the foundations of
economics, where agents can make use of quantum resources, has led to results
in quantum games [7], decision theory [6], voting systems [5], and other areas.
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On the other hand there is a well developed literature that combines classical
decision theory with elements from quantum mechanics to address various em-
pirical puzzles in a unified theoretical framework [8]. Quantum theory is used,
for instance, to model ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty. In [14], for ex-
ample, players’ preferences are allowed to be indeterminate before they make a
decision. Moreover, various authors have translated probabilistic choice models
into a quantum setting to account for empirical violations of classical choice
theory. For instance, [15] provides a quantum probability framework that ac-
counts for violations of the sure-thing principle in experiments. Order effects of
measurements on behavior and attitudes also have been addressed, for example,
in [17]. The utility of quantum mechanics (and often its contextual nature) in
addressing these specific issues, helps motivate our move to study contextuality
in general, rather than just as a part of a quantum mechanical model.
While we share the idea of using elements from quantum motivated settings
for classical decision theory, the focus in our paper is different. We consider only
the observed choices of agents from particular empirical scenarios. This means
that we do not provide an internal model of the agent. This focus is similar
to the perspective taken by [9], but, in contrast to their focus on measurement
induced effects, our main investigation is to specify under which conditions it
is possible to construct a sensible measurement at all, via an adequate global
(context-independent) choice rule from local choices. Note also that while the
presentation of our framework focuses on individual agents, it can easily be
extended to groups of agents via the connection between decision theory and
voting theory [16].
The paper is structured as follows: We first describe the mathematical frame-
work of contextuality using empirical models. Next, we define choice scenarios
and show how observed choices fit into this setting. In Sections 4 and 5 we state
the general definitions and theorems that characterize the relationship between
contextual semantics and choice scenarios. We show that, while choice scenarios
that do not obey the weak axiom can be either contextual or non-contextual,
choice scenarios that do not obey the weak axiom must be contextual. We also
show that the weak axiom is strictly weaker than the no-signalling condition.
Moreover, we show that under sufficient overlap of budgets, made precise in
the paper, the weak axiom and no-signalling are equivalent. Section 6 briefly
indicates how our setting can be extended to include probabilistic choices and
mentions how they can be characterized by the logical Bell inequalities of [2].
We conclude with a discussion that interprets these results in economic terms.
2 Mathematical Framework of Contextuality
In [2], the authors generalize a notion of contextuality from the quantum mechan-
ical setting into an abstractly logical one that can be applied to many empirical
scenarios.
Definition 1. An empirical scenario is given by
1. a set of measurements X
2. a set O of possible outcomes for the measurements
3. subsets U ⊆ X that represent possible measurement contexts
4. U , a subset of the powerset of X that defines the set of all possible measure-
ment contexts. We will call this the set of feasible experiments.
Example 2. As a simple example, we consider an empirical scenario given by two
systems A and B. We further posit that on each system we have a choice of two
different measurements, each of which has outcomes either 0 or 1, i.e. O = {0, 1}.
These systems could, for example, be two coins and we could either check if a
coin is heads or weigh it to check if it is heavier than 1 gram. This means our
empirical scenario consists of four boolean variables, X = {a, b, a′, b′} where:
a is 1 iff the first coin is heads.
a′ is 1 iff the first coin weighs over a gram.
b is 1 iff the second coin is heads.
b′ is 1 iff the second coin weighs over a gram.
As our scenario only allows us to choose one of the two measurements on the coin
at a time, an example of a measurement context is U = {a′, b′}, corresponding to
weighing both coins. The complete set of feasible experiments is given by these
two element subsets of X:
U = {{a, b}, {a, b′}, {a′, b}, {a′, b′}}.
Joint outcomes for experiments are then given by functions from measure-
ment contexts to the set of outcomes. In our example, an example function
{a 7→ 1, b 7→ 1}
represents measuring both coins to be heads.
Definition 3. Given an empirical scenario where O = {0, 1}, a binary em-
pirical model is a map C : U → P(P(X)) such that
U 7→ C(U),
where C(U) is a set of subsets of measurement context U that could have outcome
1.3
Example 4. Consider our coin scenario, but where the first coin is a double-sided
heads coin. We can specify the binary empirical model C explicitly:
{a, b} 7→ {a, {a, b}}
{a′, b} 7→ {φ, a′, b, {a′, b}}
{a, b′} 7→ {a, {a, b′}}
{a′, b′} 7→ {φ, a′, b′, {a′, b′}}
3 In other literature, C(U) is referred to as the support of the measurement context
U under the model C.
We can more easily represent the empirical model with a table like the following:
(0,0) (1,0) (0,1) (1,1)
(a,b) 0 1 0 1
(a’,b) 1 1 1 1
(a,b’) 0 1 0 1
(a’,b’) 1 1 1 1
In this table, the choice of row denotes a measurement context. Each column
then represents a particular outcome. For example, the left-most column corre-
sponds to an outcome of 0 for both systems. The column to its right corresponds
to an outcome of 1 for the first system and an outcome of 0 for the second. This
would mean that {a} ∈ C(U). The value of each cell in the table is defined by
the following rule: 1 if the set of measurements with outcome 1 is contained in
C(U) and zero otherwise. In our example the double-headed first coin means
that it is impossible for us to get a 0 outcome for the first coin when we check
its side. This gives the zeros on the first and third columns.
2.1 Contextuality
It is important to note that we do not have completely free choice in choosing the
empirical model as some empirical models lead to contradictions. We reproduce
one such example from [2] that is based on the Hardy paradox about possible
outcomes for certain quantum mechanical systems.4
Example 5. In this example we again have two systems, measurements X =
{a, b, a′, b′}, and outcomes O = {0, 1}. Consider the binary empirical model
given by the following table:
(0,0) (1,0) (0,1) (1,1)
(a,b) 1 1 1 1
(a’,b) 0 1 1 1
(a,b’) 0 1 1 1
(a’,b’) 1 1 1 0
The model specified by this table is logically inconsistent by the following rea-
soning. Interpret outcome 0 as false and outcome 1 as true and consider the
following formulas:
a ∧ b, ¬(a ∧ b′), ¬(a′ ∧ b), a′ ∨ b′.
According to the empirical model these should all be possible (true). However, it
is impossible to find individual assignments of a, b, a′, b′ to be true or false that
manifest this [2]. This observation forces us to conclude that the given empirical
model cannot be constructed by a composition of systems with defined values
for a, b, a′, and b′. This empirical model is contextual.
In short, should we encounter a system that fits a contextual model, then we
know that its behavior is not modelled by the composition of a series of separate
4 The Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states [10].
subsystems. Likewise, we know that a composition of individual systems will
never generate contextual behavior.
3 Choice
This section applies the above empirical framework to an economic choice setting
over a set of alternatives X. An agent has to choose from menus of alternatives
which comprise subsets of all possible alternatives.
Definition 6. A choice scenario is defined as the following:
1. A set of alternatives X.
2. A set O = {0, 1}. 1 indicates that an element x ∈ X is possibly chosen.
3. Subsets U ⊆ X that represent possible menus an agent can choose from.
4. A set U of menus that represents the set of feasible menus an agent can face.
5. A global choice rule C : U → P(P(X)) such that U 7→ C(U). This means that
C(U) is the set of subsets of elements in a given menu U that are possibly
chosen, i.e. whose outcome is 1.
The set of alternatives X can represent various types of choice problems. It
could be a set of consumer goods, a list of political candidates, a set of survey
questions, etc. The crucial point here is that it may be impossible to get a
complete answer to the whole set X given only answers to particular menus
one at a time. There may be various reasons for this impossibility and we will
illustrate with some examples.
When only partial information can be gathered, the key question is: Can we
infer from the local choices what an agent would choose if he or she faced the
complete set of alternatives? Under which conditions is it impossible to aggregate
local choices in a coherent way?
Example 7. Consider the following setting. A retailer offers wine at two periods
in time. Availability of wines or other concerns may naturally dictate which
menus he can offer at a given time. Let the alternatives be given by
X = {Riesling14, P inotBlanc14, Riesling13, P inotBlanc13} .
We will use the shorthand labels a, a′, b, b′ for the wines respectively so that
a is 1 iff Riesling13 is chosen.
a′ is 1 iff Pinot Blanc13 is chosen.
b is 1 iff Riesling14 is chosen.
b′ is 1 iff Pinot Blanc14 is chosen.
In such a choice scenario, choices could be observed to follow a contextual
rule as in Example 5. The contradiction in this scenario is precisely the same
one in the physical measurement setting.
Another example would be to consider two waiters who are taking orders,
one takes orders for food, and the other takes orders for beverages such that
X = {beef, cake, wine, coffee}.
What is the economic meaning of a global choice rule? Its simplest interpre-
tation is that if it were possible to let an agent choose from the global menu,
where all alternatives are available at the same time, the global choice rule de-
termines what the agent will choose. In the following section we make precise
when one can aggregate local choices into global ones.
Note that the impossibility of aggregating choices coherently depends on the
analyst’s definition of the set of alternatives. In the example above, a redefinition
of the goods would have cleared the contradictions. However, this presupposes
an understanding of the situation and background knowledge which, though
obvious in these examples, is not necessarily available to the analyst in general.
Consider another example where a coherent aggregation is obviously impossible.
Example 8. [due to Luce and Raiffa [11]] Suppose an agent is going to a restau-
rant twice. The set of meals is Salmon, Steak, FrogLegs, FriedSnails. The first
time he faces the following menu Salmon, Steak and chooses Salmon. But the
next time, facing the menu Salmon, Steak, FrogLegs, he chooses Steak.
In contrast to the examples before, the reasons why a global choice rule does
not exist is less obvious. For instance, it could mean that crucial information is
missing which would explain the agent’s choices, or it could be the case that the
agent is choosing in an incoherent way: potentially his choices are affected by
the context itself.5 All of these choice examples and any others can be brought
under the unified heading of empirical scenarios.
Theorem 9. Every choice scenario defines a unique empirical scenario with
binary empirical model and vice versa.
Proof. This is clear by inspecting the definitions. The following table provides a
glossary of sorts:
Choices Measurements
alternatives measurements
choice or non-choice outcomes
menus measurement contexts
all feasible menus all feasible experiments
global choice rule binary measurement model
4 Generalized Choice Contextuality
Having illustrated by example the connection between empirical scenarios and
choice settings, we can leverage this correspondence more generally. We begin
with some definitions of contextuality from the quantum foundations literature[2].
5 There are many alternative explanations. See also [9] on the possibility that the
measurement itself is changing the agent’s preferences.
A restriction of a function s : X → {0, 1} to U ⊆ X will be written s|X.
The support of s|X are all the elements that are mapped to 1 by it, as in the
following example. Take X = {a, b, c, d} and s = {a 7→ 1, b 7→ 1, c 7→ 0, d 7→ 0}.
Consider the restriction to U = {a, b, d}. We obtain s|U = {a 7→ 1, b 7→ 1, d 7→ 0}
and the support of s|U is {a, b}.
Definition 10. Given an empirical scenario (X,O,U) and a binary empirical
model C, a global section is an assignment s : X → O such that for all U ∈ U
the support of s|U is in C(U).
In physical terms, this says that a global section6 gives a specific outcome to
every measurement that can be used to represent any particular measurement
context. In other words, the binary empirical model can be reproduced from
restrictions of the global section.
In the choice setting, a global section means that we are able to assign a choice
or non-choice to each alternative in such a way as to reproduce the choices that
are made when restricted to any particular menu. In this sense, the existence of
such a global section determines whether or not our choices depend on the menu
with which they are presented. The following makes this intuition more precise:
Definition 11 (adapted from [1]). A binary empirical model is possibilis-
tically noncontextual if for every element η ∈ C(U) for some U , there is a
global section s′ such that η is in the support of s′|U .
When Definition 11 does not hold, the model is contextual.
The correspondence between empirical models and choice scenarios from The-
orem 9 motivates the construction of the following definition:
Definition 12 (Contextual choice scenarios). A choice scenario is non-
contextual if and only if for every element η ∈ C(U) for some U , there is
a global section s′ such that η is in the support of s′|U . Otherwise the choice
scenario is contextual.
As a way of interpreting contextuality in economic terms, we can imagine non-
contextual choice scenarios as those where we would make the same choices if
we were presented every alternative at once in a single menu.
Definition 13 (Strongly contextual choice scenarios). A choice scenario
is strongly contextual if there exists no global section.
Scenarios that are strongly contextual7 do not even have some sub-part that can
be modeled as choices made independent of context.
6 As noted in [2], the terminology global section arises because these binary empirical
models can be given the structure of a presheaf. More details on this approach can
be found in [1].
7 The notion of strong contextuality in contextual semantics comes from [1].
5 Choice Scenarios and the Theory of Choice
So far, we have interpreted the measurement of choices as a purely empirical
approach without any reference to a specific economic theory. In this section, we
will link this empirical approach to the theory of choice. To this end, we need
the notion of budgets. Economic agents have wealth constraints such that not all
alternatives may be affordable given a certain wealth level. Changing income, or
changing prices of goods, may alter the set of alternatives that are available. In
the following, we will give menus an alternative interpretation: they represent
the budget; thus they represent the alternatives that are affordable for a given
agent.8
When menus and budgets coincide, choice scenarios will always allow us to
capture the observed behavior of agents acting according to the usual economic
choice structures [13, p.9]. In fact, choice scenarios are more general than the
usual choice structures, as the following is clear by definition:
Proposition 14. A choice structure is a choice scenario where |C(U)| = 1 for
all U .
5.1 The Weak Axiom and Contextuality
A central question in the theory of choice is how behavior changes over different
budgets. As a rationality requirement, consistency of choices is imposed via the
weak axiom of revealed preferences. In our choice scenario setting, this has the
following form:
Definition 15. A choice scenario obeys the weak axiom if for every pair of
budgets A,B, with elements x, y ∈ A∩B such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B) then
x ∈ C(B).
For a simple example where the weak axiom is violated reconsider Example
8. As Salmon is preferred over Steak in the first menu, it should also be chosen
in the larger menu Salmon, Steak, FrogLegs.
In the following, we investigate the relationship between contextual choice
scenarios and ones whose choice rules obey the weak axiom (Figure 1).
Theorem 16. Choice scenarios that do not obey the weak axiom are contextual
if the set of budgets is closed under intersection.
Proof. As our scenario does not obey the weak axiom, we know that there exists
a pair of budgets A,B, with elements x, y ∈ A ∩ B such that x ∈ C(A) and
y ∈ C(B), but x is not in C(B). We will use this to demonstrate that there
exists no global section that can adequately assign a value to x.
8 Obviously, one could also consider a blend of the two views: (i) what is presented in
a menu and (ii) what is affordable? We focus on the extreme case for simplicity.
Suppose there were such a section s : X → O. As x ∈ C(A) but not in C(B),
we would require x to be in the support of s|A but not in the support of s|B.
As budgets are closed under intersection, we reach a contradiction when trying
to assign x to the support of s|A ∩ B. As we cannot construct a global section
that satisfies the definition of possibilistic noncontextuality, the choice scenario
must be contextual.
Theorem 17. Choice scenarios that obey the weak axiom can be either contex-
tual or non-contextual.
Proof. We show this with two examples. In the first, let budget A = {a, b} and
budget B = {a, c}. Choose a global section s : {a, b, c} → {0, 1} that sends only
a to 1. A choice rule that has C(A) = C(B) = {a} obeys the weak axiom and
is non-contextual. As the second example, let A = {a, b} and B = {b, c}. Again,
choose a global section s : {a, b, c} → {0, 1} that sends only a to 1. A choice rule
that has C(A) = {a} and C(B) = {b} obeys the weak axiom and is contextual.
In some sense, this decoupling of the weak axiom and contextuality results from
the fact that the weak axiom only conditions the behavior of the choice rule for
elements that are in C(U), i.e. elements that are chosen. Contextuality, on the
other hand, requires a consistency over contexts where elements are not chosen
as well, i.e. if an element is not chosen in some context, then it must also be not
chosen in other contexts.
5.2 The Weak Axiom and No-Signalling
The weak axiom can also be related to the no-signalling condition for empirical
models, whose definition from [1] we adapt to our setting. For a budget A ∈ U ,
let fA : A→ {0, 1} be the choice function that sends an element to 1 when it is
chosen - i.e. is in some element of C(A) - and sends an element to 0 when it is
not.
Definition 18. A choice scenario (X,U , C) is non-signalling if and only if for
any two budgets A,B ∈ U :
fA|(A ∩B) = fB |(A ∩B),
i.e. all the choice functions have to agree when restricted to their intersections.
In our framework, no-signalling choices are those where the choice or non-
choice of an alternative must be consistent across all the budgets in which that
alternative appears. It is perhaps not surprising then that such a strong global
consistency condition obeys the weak axiom, as is shown in the following theo-
rem:
Theorem 19. Non-signalling choice scenarios obey the weak axiom.
Fig. 1. The overlapping space of scenarios, summarizing the results of Section 5. Sce-
narios in the red region are specified in Theorem 21. Scenarios in the blue region are
charecterized by Theorem 16.
Proof. Using this notion of choice functions for budgets, the weak axiom states
that if fA(x) = 1 and fB(y) = 1 then fB(x) = 1. By the symmetry of the
definition, it is easy to see that fA(y) = 1 necessarily as well. If fA(x) = 1 and
fB(y) = 1, then no-signalling implies the same.
Indeed, the no-signalling requirement is actually stronger then that required
for the weak axiom (Figure 1). There do exist choice scenarios where agents act
rationally, but not exactly consistently over all budgets.
Theorem 20. The weak axiom is strictly weaker than no-signalling.
Proof. Consider the following example for x, y ∈ A ∩ B. Let fA(x) = 1 and
fA(y) = fB(x) = fB(y) = 0.
As in the previous discussion of the weak axiom and contextuality, the economic
condition is weaker than the physically influenced one because non-choices are
not required to be consistent. One can freely not choose an alternative in one
budget, but then choose it in another if there is no preferable option. In an
empirical scenario though, the observed outcome of ”not-chosen” needs to be
considered in consistency conditions.
Still, we can give a clear picture of when the two are equivalent.
Theorem 21. The weak axiom is equivalent to no-signalling if a choice scenario
has the following property for all budgets A and B:
there exists not necc. distinct x, y ∈ A ∩B s.t. x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B). (1)
Proof. We show this by contradiction. Consider a choice scenario that obeys the
weak axiom and property (1) but that is not no-signalling. A signalling choice
scenario has some z ∈ A∩B such that fA(z) 6= fB(z). Without loss of generality
we can take fA(z) = 1 and fB(z) = 0. By property (1), we can always find some
y ∈ A∩B such that fB(y) = 1, yet the weak axiom states that if fA(z) = 1 and
fB(y) = 1 then fB(z) = 1 causing a contradiction.
In economic terms this property (1) states that an agent, when presented with
two budgets that have overlapping alternatives, must, in each budget, choose at
least one alternative from the overlapping ones.
Results from this section are summarized in Figure 1, showing how contex-
tual, non-signalling, and weak axiom scenarios are interrelated.
6 Probabilistic Choices
Our setting naturally generalizes to probabilistic choice scenarios. Here the out-
come set is O = [0, 1], where 1 indicates that an element x ∈ X is always chosen,
and the choice rule C is replaced with probability distributions dU : X → O for
each context.
Every probabilistic choice scenario can be reduced to an underlying choice
scenario by taking C(U) as the support of dU . In this way we are able to label
probabilistic choice scenarios contextual or strongly contextual according to the
property of this underlying choice scenario.
In these probabilistic settings, we can use a single logical bell inequality to
test for contextuality [2]. Further, these inequalities provide a metric for under-
standing the degree to which a scenario is contextual from how close a scenario
is to the bound. Scenarios that maximally violate a bell inequality are exactly
the strongly contextual ones [2].
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have constructed a framework for analyzing the contextuality
of choices using tools from quantum foundations, mapping out the logical space
of some important physical and economic principles. We show that a series of
logical Bell inequalities can be applied to understand the degree of contextuality
of choice scenarios. In economic terms, these results are of particular interest for
the following reasons:
The observation of contextual choices can imply the non-existence of consis-
tent internal models of choice. To the extent that we believe individual agents
not to be purely motivated by individual preferences, measures of contextuality
can act as measurements of collusion as they categorically represent behaviors
that cannot be generated from fixed individual choices.
To the extent that we doubt agents are well modelled by individual pref-
erences, contextual frameworks provide a setting to investigate more general
alternatives without sacrificing rigor and specificity. The foundations of quan-
tum computation, that are well suited to deal with contextualities, provide a
rich toolbox for economics to address these problems.
Even if the phenomena of contextuality is, at present, rarely observed it is
still relevant because we know that it is possible to physically implement it with
quantum systems. One could program quantum computers to make contextual
choices and, by so doing, allow for more behaviors than can be modelled classi-
cally if it proves advantageous.
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